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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Antonio Lino Coronado appeals from his conviction for driving under the inﬂuence,

entered on a conditional guilty plea, arguing that the district court erred

by denying

his

motion

t0

suppress evidence.

Statement
In

Of The
its

Facts

And Course Of The

Proceedings

order addressing Antonio Coronado’s motion t0 suppress, Which

this appeal, the district court

made

the following ﬁndings 0f fact,

is

the subject of

none 0f Which are contested by

Coronado:

On November

24, 2018, Shirley

to report a “suspicious” blue

and Beech

St. in

McCreary

called

non-emergency dispatch

pickup truck in her neighborhood, near Iowa Ave.

Caldwell.

Shirley testiﬁed that she

was smoking a

cigarette

0n her

front porch shortly

am. when she ﬁrst noticed the truck parked near the street corner in
of her house. The truck was “suspicious” t0 her because she did not

after 8:00

front

recognize

it

from the neighborhood and because the driver —

Defendant — was

sitting in the truck

later

identiﬁed as the

playing loud music. She testiﬁed that the

was parked “for a While” and then drove away toward Linden St. She was
smoking her cigarette When the truck came back and parked across the street
from her house. Shirley ﬁnished her cigarette and went inside to tell her daughter
about the truck. Her daughter [Jennifer Alpaugh] encouraged her to call police and

truck
still

report

it

as a suspicious vehicle.

Shirley called dispatch around 9:44

am. She

reported the suspicious

vehicle, but did not report a crime or other apparent criminal activity.1 Ofc.

Heaton drove out to the scene. Dispatch advised Ofc. Heaton that the reporting
saw the vehicle park in several difference places, drive around the block,
and then return to park in front 0f her house, With the vehicle’s motor running and
someone sitting in the parked vehicle.
Around 10:00 am. Ofc. Heaton located the blue truck parked on Iowa
Ave. near the location identiﬁed by the reporting party, with one person sitting in
party

1

Jennifer

Alpaugh testiﬁed

that there

had been criminal activity in the neighborhood before;
is n0 evidence that this information was

however, she was not speciﬁc about details and there
relayed to dispatch or the responding ofﬁcer.

The ofﬁcer did not

the driver’s seat.

see the Defendant

commit any

trafﬁc

Violations.

After he drove past the truck, Ofc. Heaton parked 1-2 car lengths behind
(facing the

same

direction)

and activated his overhead

lights. (State’s

EX.

1

it

[the

ofﬁcer’s body-cam Video]). Ofc. Heaton testiﬁed that he activated his overhead
lights for trafﬁc safety

and

t0 let the driver

0f the truck

know

that the ofﬁcer

“was

there to talk t0 him.”

Ofc. Heaton testiﬁed that dispatch often receives suspicious vehicle calls

and

that his initial impression

lost 0r

looking for a work

of the situation was that the driver was probably

site.

The ofﬁcer thought

was likely an innocent
suspect criminal activity. However, he testiﬁed
it

situation

and did not necessarily

that the

circumstances reported t0 dispatch could be indicative of criminal

activity, like theft or burglary, or

When he found
what was going

of someone needing assistance.

the “suspicious” vehicle, he

wanted

He

testiﬁed that

t0 talk t0 the driver t0 discern

on.

was parked With its
motor running. Ofc. Heaton did not testify about Whether or not the truck’s motor
was running when he arrived and initiated the encounter. The circumstances
depicted in State’s EX. 1 indicate that the truck’s motor was not running When
Shirley apparently reported t0 dispatch that the truck

Ofc. Heaton arrived and initiated the encounter.2
Ofc. Heaton exited his car and walked up to truck’s driver-side window.

The Defendant was talking 0n his phone. The ofﬁcer identiﬁed himself and
explained why he was there. Ofc. Heaton asked the Defendant for his driver’s
license, registration, and proof of insurance. While he was searching for those
items, Ofc. Heaton saw him place a Coors beer can in the passenger compartment
0f the pickup truck. It is readily apparent from State’s EX. 1 that the Defendant
admitted to the ofﬁcer that his license was suspended and that he drank a “couple”
beers that moming.3 The ofﬁcer reasonably suspected criminal activity and
conducted an investigation.

2

On

Heaton asks the Defendant, “Where are the keys t0 the truck?” The
Defendant then appears to search around the center console and near his feet for the keys; the
keys apparently were not in the ignition. Ofc. Heaton makes other statements that in context
indicate that the truck was not currently running (“You were running the engine here just a little
bit ago.”). From what is depicted in State’s EX. 1, the Court can reasonably infer that the truck’s
motor was not running When Ofc. Heaton parked, activated his emergency lights, and approached
the Video, Ofc.

the tuck.
3

The Defendant’s native language is Spanish and not English; however, the Video reveals that
the Defendant’s spoken English was discernible and that there did not appear to be a language
barrier preventing the ofﬁcer and the Defendant from communicating and understanding each
other.

(R.,

Coronado

pp.76-78 (footnotes original).)

was

ﬁeld sobriety

tests

and was

arrested.

(R.,

Subsequent testing showed that Coronado’s blood/alcohol

pp.9-11 (probable cause afﬁdavit).)

content

failed

.207. (EXS., p.1.)

Following a preliminary hearing, Coronado was charged With felony driving under the
inﬂuence, having been convicted

at least

twice within the previous ten years 0f driving under the

inﬂuence; driving Without privileges; and possession 0f an open container 0f alcohol in a vehicle.
(R., pp.32-37.)

He ﬁled

a motion to suppress (R., pp.41-42) and

argued that he was seized
vehicle,

and turned 0n

seizure,

and

pp.44-52).

his

when Ofﬁcer Heaton

overhead

The

state

The

district court

(R., pp.76-86.)

1.

(R.,

initiate

an

any brief seizure was also justiﬁed by

held a hearing 0n the motion at Which Ms. McCreary, Ms. Alpaugh, and

at

(TL, pp.1-27.4)

Which Ofﬁcer Heaton’s body-cam Video was introduced
It

as

then issued a written order denying the motion t0 suppress.

After making the factual ﬁndings quoted above, the court determined that

Coronado had not shown

4

the

function. (R., pp.64-72.)

Ofﬁcer Heaton testiﬁed, and
State’s Exhibit

his parked

be justiﬁed under the community caretaking exception

responded that Ofﬁcer Heaton had reasonable suspicion t0

community caretaking

which he

was n0 reasonable suspicion justifying

investigative detention at that time and, in the alternative,

the

in support in

on scene, pulled behind

arrived

lights, that there

that the seizure could not

memorandum

that

he was seized before

until after

The ﬁle “Transcripts Appeal 47391-2019.pdf’ contains

Ofﬁcer Heaton observed an open

on the
motion to suppress (Tr., pp.1-27), the transcript of the change of plea hearing (TL, pp.28-39), and
the transcript 0f the sentencing hearing (TL, pp.40-49). References to page numbers correspond
t0 the pagination of that ﬁle as a Whole. Only the transcript 0f the hearing 0n the motion t0
suppress includes numbered lines. Ofﬁcer Heaton’s body-cam Video Will be referred t0 herein as
“State’s EX. 1.”

the transcript 0f the hearing

container of alcohol in the vehicle and Coronado acknowledged driving With a suspended

license, at

which point there

investigative detention.

that

is

not dispute that Ofﬁcer Heaton had reasonable suspicion for an

(R., pp.78-84.)

In the alternative, assuming that

Coronado was correct

he was seized When Ofﬁcer Heaton arrived and turned 0n his overhead

lights, the district

court held that Ofﬁcer Heaton had reasonable suspicion t0 initiate a brief investigative detention

at that time.

(R., pp.84-85.)

Coronado accepting a plea agreement pursuant

t0

Which he pleaded

guilty to felony

driving under the inﬂuence, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress,

While the remaining charges were dismissed.

(R., p.95; Tr., pp.30-38.)

years With two years ﬁxed, and that sentence

was suspended

(R., pp.1 19-21.)

He timely appealed.

(R., pp.122-25.)

in favor

He was

sentenced t0 ﬁve

of ﬁve years 0f probation.

M
Coronado

Did the

states the issue

district court err

0n appeal

When

it

as:

denied Mr. Coronado’s motion to suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Coronado

failed t0

show

that the district court erred

by denying

his

motion

to suppress?

ARGUMENT
Coronado Has Not Shown That The
A.

District Court Erred

Suppress

Introduction

Coronado argues on appeal

Amendment

Fourth

seizure

when Ofﬁcer Heaton parked one
overhead

initiated his

district court erred in holding, in the alternative, that

initiate a brief investigatory

incorrect

by concluding

that the district court erred

Coronado’s already-parked truck and

to

lights.

that there

was no

two car lengths behind

He

also argues that the

Ofﬁcer Heaton had reasonable suspicion

to

Coronado

is

detention at that time, assuming arguendo that he did.

0n both counts.

With respect
whenever an ofﬁcer

Along With a

large

rejected such a rule.

t0 the seizure,

initiates

Coronado

overhead

number of

lights

is

advocating for a per se rule that a seizure occurs

when parking behind an

already-parked vehicle.

courts from other jurisdictions, Idaho’s appellate courts have

Though undoubtedly

a signiﬁcant factor in the totality of the circumstances,

the use of overhead lights in such circumstances

is

BV Denying His Motion To

is

just

one factor

to

be weighed with others and

not alone sufﬁcient t0 effectuate a seizure. The district court correctly concluded that n0 other

weighed

factors

in favor

circumstances, he

Next, the

was

0f a ﬁnding that Coronado was seized and, in the

totality

of the

not.

district court correctly

was reasonable suspicion sufﬁcient
investigatory detention at issue here.

recognized

that,

t0 justify the

even

very

if

he was seized

brief,

at that time, there

extraordinarily non-invasive

Ofﬁcer Heaton was aware

that police

had received a

complaint from a resident regarding a suspicious and unfamiliar vehicle parking, idling, and

moving
that

t0 different locations Within a residential neighborhood.

Ofﬁcer Heaton testiﬁed

conduct was consistent with the behavior of a burglar casing houses.

When

that

he arrived, he

located a vehicle parked in the neighborhood, With a single occupant, meeting the description

provided by the individual

who

Though Ofﬁcer Heaton

called police.

certainly did not

have

probable cause t0 believe that Coronado was involved in criminal conduct, and in fact believed

there

may be

an innocent explanation regarding Coronado’s behavior, he also reasonably

suspected the possibility that Coronado was involved in criminal conduct.
detained at

the detention

all,

If

Coronado was

was exceptionally non-invasive, involving only Ofﬁcer Heaton

having a polite conversation With Coronado in his already parked vehicle.

That detention was

reasonable in light 0f Ofﬁcer Heaton’s suspicion.

Finally,

assuming

that the district court erred in both

ways addressed above,

this

Court

should afﬁrm on the alternative ground, raised below, that the detention was justiﬁed by the

community caretaking

Standard

B.

function.

Of Review

“In reviewing a district court order granting 0r denying a motion to suppress evidence, the

standard 0f review

is

bifurcated.

This Court Will accept the

they are clearly erroneous. However, this Court

trial

may freely review

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact unless

the trial court’s application of

constitutional principles in light 0f the facts found.” State V. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 628,

801, 803 (2019);

ﬂ

(“When reviewing
clearly erroneous.

also State V. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 247,

‘seizure’ issues,

We

we

defer to the

trial

787 P.2d 231, 233 (1990)

court’s factual ﬁndings, unless they are

freely review, de novo, the trial court’s legal determination

not an illegal seizure occurred”).

“At a suppression hearing, the power

0f Whether or

t0 assess the credibility

0f witnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences
the

trial

court.” State V. Pieper, 163 Idaho 732, 734,

434 P.3d

418 P.3d 1241, 1243

(Ct.

is

vested in

App. 2018).

C.

The

District

Seized

Court Correctly Determined That Coronado Has Not

Shown That He Was

When Ofﬁcer Heaton Parked Near Him And Initiated His Overhead Lights

The Fourth Amendment

t0 the U.S. Constitution

and Article

I,

Section 17 0f the Idaho

U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const.

Constitution prohibit unreasonable seizures.

§ 17.5

art. I,

This prohibition “is not implicated, however, by every contact between police and citizens.”
State V. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 612, 7 P.3d 219, 221 (2000).

“An encounter between

an individual does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless
test t0

it is

police and

Li The

non-consensual.”

determine Whether an encounter constitutes a seizure, and so implicates the Fourth

Amendment,

“is

an objective one.”

(2004). “[A] seizure occurs ‘only

if,

State V. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 165, 107 P.3d 1214,

in

View 0f all of the circumstances surrounding the

a reasonable person would have believed that he

States V. Mendenhall,

was not

446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).

free t0 leave.”

Li

1216

incident,

(Quoting

m

“[W]hile ‘most citizens Will respond to a

police request, the fact that people d0 so, and do so without being told they are free not to

respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.”

State V. Nelson, 134 Idaho

675, 679, 8 P.3d 670, 674 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting I.N.S. V. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)).

Thus, the question

is

not whether the particular person involved in the encounter in fact engaged

With the ofﬁcer, or Whether most people would have, but Whether “the circumstances of the
encounter are so intimidating as t0 demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he

5

Coronado did not argue below

context than does the Fourth

Obenchain

V.

court review

McAlvain
is

that Article

Section 17, provides any greater protection in this

He

Amendment.

has therefore waived that argument.

Const., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443,

limited t0 the evidence, theories and arguments that

(internal quotation

marks and

on appeal, he has not argued

ellipses omitted)).

that

it

(issues not supported

ﬂ

E

444 (2006) (“Appellate
were presented below.”

Likewise, while he cites the Idaho Constitution

provides any greater protection. (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

has therefore waived any such argument.

970 (1996)

I,

He

State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,

by argument and

authority in opening brief are waived).

was not

Delgado, 466 U.S.

free to leave.”

intimidating, “[t]here

is

216. Further, even

When

seizure, the defendant bears the

is

burden of proving that a seizure occurred.” State

district court erred

by concluding

Ofﬁcer Heaton made a “show 0f authority

free to leave”

and

486, 211 P.3d

at 95.

(2)

Coronado “submitted

Coronado argued below

that

show of

“When

a

alleged t0 have been obtained as a result 0f an illegal

Idaho 35, 38, 368 P.3d 655, 658 (2016) (quotation marks omitted).

(1)

to the ofﬁcer’s

147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009).

defendant seeks t0 suppress evidence that

determine Whether the

the circumstances are so

n0 seizure unless the individual actually submits

State V. Willoughby,

authority.”

at

.

.

.

to that

that

V.

Pachosa, 160

Thus, this Court must

Coronado had not established

that

such that a reasonable person would not feel

show of authority.” Willoughby, 147 Idaho

at

he “was seized as soon as Ofﬁcer Heaton parked his police

vehicle directly behind Mr. Coronado’s truck, activated his overhead emergency lights, and Mr.

Coronado submitted
p.22, L.24

Coronado

—

t0 this

show of authority by remaining 0n

p.23, L.10 (arguing that “the ofﬁcer pulled

up

directly

indicates in his afﬁdavit he didn’t feel free to leave.

that situation

would not

feel free t0 leave.

So

scene.”

I

(R., p.47.

E

alﬂ TL,

behind Mr. Coronado. Mr.

believe a reasonable person in

as far as that goes,

I

was a

think there

seizure, a

detention certainly.”).) Relying exclusively on the fact that Ofﬁcer Heaton parked one or two car
lengths behind Coronado’s already-parked vehicle and initiated his overhead lights,

advocating for a per se rule that a seizure occurs under such circumstances.

both Idaho Supreme Court and

The

district court correctly

moving

cars,

many

courts

w

lights

is

discussed below,

from other jurisdictions have rejected such a

concluded that “use of emergency

Without the motor running,

As

Coronado

on persons

in parked,

rule.

non-

constitute a technical 0r defacto seizure, but is

a ‘signiﬁcant factor’ t0 consider in the totality of the circumstances analysis.”

(R.,

p.83

(emphasis in original) (quoting State

V.

Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 486-88, 211 P.3d 91, 95-97

(2009).) Then, looking to the totality of the circumstances, the court correctly concluded that

there

was n0

seizure because there

were n0 other

factors indicating that

Coronado had been

detained. (R., pp.83-84.)

The
ofﬁcer

878

district court

When parking

(Ct.

addressed two Idaho cases concerning the use 0f overhead lights by an

near an already-parked vehicle: State

App. 1999), and State

In

m,

V.

V.

Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 991 P.2d

Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 211 P.3d 91 (2009).

an ofﬁcer was following a vehicle reported as suspicious when the vehicle

abruptly pulled t0 the side 0f the road, and the ofﬁcer then initiated his overhead lights and

m,

pulled behind the vehicle.

133 Idaho

691, 991 P.2d at 879.

at

The Court of Appeals

determined that “this did constitute a technical, de facto detention commanding Mireles to

remain stopped pursuant

t0

LC.

§

49-625.” Li.

at

692, 991 P.2d at 880.

Idaho Code § 49-625

provides that “the driver of every vehicle” approached by a police vehicle with emergency lights
operating must “yield the right-of—way and immediately drive” to the curb 0n the right side 0f the

roadway and remain there
1404(1), providing,

“Any

pursuing police vehicle

until the

ofﬁcer passes. The court additionally cited Idaho Code § 49-

driver of a

when given

be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

motor vehicle Who wilfully ﬂees or attempts

to elude a

a Visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall

Li. at 692,

991 P.2d

at 880.

Here, the district court correctly recognized that those statutes do not have similar

application.

(R., pp.82-83.)

by an ofﬁcer With emergency
or

is

In particular, Idaho

lights activated.

in actual physical control

means “being

Code

The term

of a vehicle,” LC.

in the driver’s position

§

§

49-625 applies to a “driver” approached
‘driver’

means “every person Who

49-10505), While

drives

‘actual physical control’

0f a motor vehicle with the motor running 0r the vehicle

10

moving,”

I.C. § 49-102(4).

was driving

his vehicle or

Thus, Idaho Code

was

49-625 had application here only

§

sitting in the driver’s position

court found, and Coronado does not contest, that he

was not running.

(R.,

was parked when he

therefore has

n0 application.6

LC.

§

E

m,

arrived and the engine 0f which

Willoughby, 147 Idaho

at

Coronado

motor running. The
the vehicle and

its

district

motor

Ofﬁcer Heaton pulled behind

was not running. The

statute

487, 211 P.3d at 96 (holding that

49-625 was inapplicable Where defendant was in a parked vehicle When ofﬁcers arrived

and so was not a “driver” under the
concluded that Idaho Code

of a motor vehicle

Who

§

For similar reasons, the

statute).

§ 49-1404(1).

487, 211 P.3d

statute has

n0

motor vehicle When
at

that “[a]ny driver

wilfully ﬂees 0r attempts t0 elude a pursuing police vehicle

Coronado was not a “driver” and he was not

signal t0 “stop” a

district court correctly

49-1404 has n0 application. That statue provides

Visual or audible signal t0 bring the vehicle to a stop” thereby

at

its

was not driving

pp.78 n.2, 83.) Unlike the ofﬁcer in

a vehicle that

with

if

that vehicle

commits a misdemeanor.

(in fact,

was not moving.

‘signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.”’ (quoting

overhead

LC.

lights

a

I.C.

could not have been) given a

E

Willoughby, 147 Idaho

96 (“As Willoughby was already parked and made n0

facial application as the ofﬁcers’

When given

effort t0 leave, the

cannot be said t0 have been a

§ 49-1404(1))).

Coronado had been a “driver,” the Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that, “A driver
Who pulls over and stops as required by section 49-625 has not been seized, any more than has a
driver Who is required by law t0 stop upon approaching a school bus displaying Visual signals,
LC. § 49-1422, or at a railroad crossing displaying Visual signals, LC. § 49-648, or at a ﬂashing
red trafﬁc signal, LC. § 49-804(1), 0r at a steady red trafﬁc signal, I.C. § 49-802(3).” State V.
153 Idaho 564, 567, 286 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2012) (holding that Where an ofﬁcer initiated his
overhead lights to effectuate a trafﬁc stop 0f a Subaru, and both the Subaru and the defendant,
driving a Toyota, stopped in response t0 the lights, defendant was not seized though he was
responding t0 overhead lights, though ofﬁcer parked near the Toyota, and though the ofﬁcer
immediately walked back to speak t0 the defendant).
6

Even

if

m,

11

On

appeal,

Coronado does not argue

that the district court’s conclusion that these statutes

had no application was erroneous. Though he alleges
prohibited

him from

leaving, he provides

n0 indication how the

does n0 discuss the language 0f the

otherwise,

in a conclusory fashion that those statutes

statutes,

by concluding

district court erred

and does not

try to

distinguish

Willoughby, which concluded that the same statutes had no application in a factually similar
(Appellant’s brief, p.15.) In fact, he acknowledges that Willoughby held that the

circumstance.

statutes

had n0 application under relevantly similar circumstances. (Appellant’s

Instead,

he argues that “whether the engine

is

turned off 0r the vehicle

not determinative 0f a detention” because “the relevant test

communicate

to a reasonable

running

at the

time

is

Whether the circumstances would

person that they were not free t0 leave and end the encounter.”

That

(Appellant’s brief, p.15.)

is

is

brief, pp.15-16.)

is,

he correctly notes that the technical application of these

particular statutes is not dispositive.

The

district court

did not conclude otherwise.

Instead, citing Willoughby, the court

recognized that Ofﬁcer Heaton’s use 0f overhead lights was a signiﬁcant, but not dispositive
factor t0 be considered in the totality of the circumstances

had been
p.83.)

When determining Whether Coronado

seized, notwithstanding the fact that those particular statutes

In Willoughby, the Idaho

were inapplicable.

Supreme Court addressed a circumstance,

like this

(R.,

one,

involving an already parked vehicle and the use of overhead lights. Willoughby was sitting in his

parked car in a

lot

When

ofﬁcers arrived with lights and sirens on to investigate a reported ﬁght,

m

and the ofﬁcers then approached
P.3d

at 93-94.

Relying 0n

t0 talk

with Willoughby. Willoughby, 147 Idaho

at

and Idaho Code §§ 49-625 and 49-1404, the

484-85, 211

district court

determined that Willoughby was seized When ofﬁcers parked near Willoughby with lights and
sirens on.

Li

at

486, 211 P.3d

at 95.

On

review, the Supreme Court ﬁrst held, for the reasons

12

m

discussed above, that

and Idaho Code §§ 49-625 and 49-1404 were inapposite. Li

at

486-87, 211 P.3d at 95-96. But, the Court recognized, that did not resolve the question whether

Willoughby was

seized.

the ofﬁcers’ use 0f overhead

show of authority

that

211 P.3d

Li. at 487,

emergency

would convey

The Court

at 96.

lights in close

to a reasonable

still

had

proximity t0 a parked vehicle constitutes a

person that the ofﬁcer was ordering him or

her t0 restrict his or her movement.” Li. (quotation marks omitted). The Court held
the use 0f light under such circumstances

0f overhead

was not by

lights is a signiﬁcant factor a court

“Whether

to determine

that,

though

itself sufﬁcient to effect a seizure, “the

must consider when considering the

use

totality

of

the circumstances.” Li.

The Court went 0n

t0

afﬁrm the

district court’s

seized, but speciﬁcally because the appellate record

assume

that the district court erred

determination that Willoughby was

was incomplete and

from an incomplete record.

the beneﬁt of Viewing diagrams 0f the parking

lot,

It

the Court

noted that the

indicating the exits and

would not

district court

had

Where the various

vehicles were parked, but that those diagrams were not in the appellate record. Li. at 487-88, 211

P.3d

at 96-97.

parking

lot

Because Whether the ofﬁcers were blocking Willoughby’s

would be a signiﬁcant

factor in that totality 0f the circumstances analysis

record before the Court did not “reﬂect the layout of the parking

number of exits nor

d[id] the record reﬂect

front of Willoughby’s vehicle 0r

Willoughby

t0 leave

erred. Li. at 488,

lot,

and the

including the location and

Whether the ofﬁcers parked their vehicles behind 0r in

Whether the ofﬁcers’ vehicles would have impeded any

had he so desired,” the Court declined

211 P.3d

ability t0 exit the

t0

presume

effort

by

that the district court

at 97.

Willoughby makes clear

that a defendant sitting in a

parked vehicle With the engine off is

not seized simply because an ofﬁcer employed overhead lights (or even a siren) and approaches

13

As

the vehicle t0 speak With the defendant.7

is

a “signiﬁcant factor,”

is

it

just

the Court emphasized, While use 0f overhead lights

one factor in the

determining Whether a seizure has occurred, and

Idaho

is

totality

of the circumstances relevant to

not by itself dispositive.

Willoughby, 147

487, 211 P.3d at 96.

at

Nor

Idaho remotely unique in having so concluded.

is

522 F.3d 790, 794-95 (7th

Cir.

initiated

approached t0 speak to the defendant); Miller

V. Harget,

666 (Or.

Ct.

gg; United States

V.

Clements,

2008) (holding that there was n0 seizure where ofﬁcer parked

behind defendant’s already-parked vehicle,

N.W.2d

(same); State V. Hanson, 504

E

the patrol

car’s

458 F.3d 125 1, 1257-58

219, 220 (Minn. 1993) (same); State

App. 2000) (same); Martin

V. State,

overhead

lights,

(1 1th Cir.

V. Blair,

and

2006)

14 P.3d 660,

104 S.W.3d 298, 301 (TeX. Ct. App. 2003)

(same); State V. Dubois, 706 P.2d 588, 589 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (same). These cases reﬂect that a

reasonable person would understand that the use of overhead lights in such circumstances, as

opposed

t0 in

an ordinary trafﬁc

stop,

may be

associated With various purposes unrelated to

detaining the occupant of the nearby vehicle, such as ofﬁcer safety, an attempt t0 alert the

occupant 0f the vehicle to the ofﬁcer’s presence, or in responding t0 an emergency entirely
unrelated t0 the

E

occupant.

circumstances, “ofﬁcers

may

Ma_rtin,

104 S.W.3d

at

301

(recognizing that,

such

in

well activate their emergency lights for reasons of highway safety

0r so as not t0 unduly alarm the stopped motorists,” rather than t0 indicate the defendant

detained).

Heaton

7

(TL, p.14, L.21

testifying that

—

p.15, L.8 (asked

Why he

turned 0n his overhead lights, Ofﬁcer

he did so because he “wanted to make sure they [Coronado] knew

Here, as opposed to in Willoughby, the ofﬁcer did not have a siren on. (State’s EX.

14

was

1.)

I

was

there” and “there’s trafﬁc hazard that

in the

middle of the

you want people

that

you When you’re walking

street”).8

In fact, the Court’s discussion in

district court’s

to avoid hitting

Willoughby suggests

that

it

would have reversed

holding that Willoughby was seized had the appellate record contained evidence

Willoughby’s vehicle was not blocked in by the ofﬁcers. Willoughby, 147 Idaho

211 P.3d

at

The

96-97.

district court

was afﬁrmed only because

evidence and the Court would not presume

error.

Li.

Coronado was not blocked by Ofﬁcer Heaton and
competent evidence.

(R.,

p.83

Here, there

that

ﬁnding

is

is

an uncontested ﬁnding that

supported by substantial and

(“The Defendant’s truck was not blocked in or physically

1.)

Nor

are there

that

he was unlawﬁllly seized When Ofﬁcer Heaton arrived and initiated his overhead

lights. (R., p.47.)

sometime

any other

He

thereafter.

factors suggesting that

Coronado was detained.

could not

argue 0n

Coronado argued

cannot argue on appeal that the allegedly unlawful detention occurred

E

State V. Gonzales, 165

Idaho

(2019) (Where state argued below that seizure occurred

8

487-88,

at

the record did not include that

prevented from leaving. The patrol car was parked 1-2 car lengths away”); State’s EX.

below

the

appeal that

seizure

occurred

at

at

a

667,

671-73, 450 P.3d 315, 319-21

a certain point, holding that the state

later

point).

But even looking

to

Ofﬁcer Heaton turned on his
Coronado
acknowledges that the district court’s ﬁnding that Ofﬁcer Heaton was motivated by safety
considerations is supported by Ofﬁcer Heaton’s uncontroverted testimony. (Id.) Nonetheless, he
argues that it is clearly erroneous because the district court did not make the further ﬁnding that
Ofﬁcer Heaton also turned 0n his overhead lights to notify Coronado of his presence. (Id.)
Whether a ﬁnding is clearly erroneous is determined by Whether there is substantial and
competent evidence t0 support it. Woods V. Woods, 163 Idaho 904, 907, 422 P.3d 1110, 1113
(2018). That does not turn on whether the district court made some further ﬁnding that the

Coronado contends

that the district court’s factual

ﬁnding

that

overhead

lights for safety reasons is clearly erroneous.

(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

appellant

would

district court

like

it

t0

Ofﬁcer Heaton turned on

have made. But in addition, the
his overhead lights, in part, t0

p.77.)
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alert

did speciﬁcally

Coronado

ﬁnd

t0 his presence.

that
(R.,

Ofﬁcer Heaton’s subsequent interaction With Coronado, there

is

nothing to indicate a detention

before Ofﬁcer Heaton observed an open container of alcohol in the vehicle and Coronado

acknowledged he had a suspended
Circumstances that

may

license.9

distinguish a seizure from a consensual encounter, “‘even

the defendant did not attempt to leave,

display of a

weapon by an

ofﬁcer,

would be

When

the threatening presence 0f several ofﬁcers, the

some physical touching of the person of the

citizen, or the

use

of language 0r tone 0f voice indicating that compliance with the ofﬁcer’s request might be

compelled.”

State V. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 684,

(quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554).

initial interaction

and conversational, introducing himself and explaining

department.

We

got a

call,

someone

“How’s

called and

they were nervous.” (quoting State’s Exhibit

it

With Coronado was friendly

why he was

there.

was complaining about you

1,

00:12-00:15)).)

ﬂ

him

DUI

alcohol and after Coronado acknowledged having

after

police

sitting out here,

and

was seized by ofﬁcers

in a parking lot, holding that “Landreth

to investigate a potential

]

State V. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986,

Coronado has never argued, and does not argue on appeal,

permitted t0 detain

[

Approaching the vehicle and

991, 88 P.3d 1226, 1231 (Ct. App. 2004) (Where defendant alleged he

9

(Appellant’s brief,

going? Hey, Ofﬁcer Heaton 0f the

speaking to Coronado was n0 indication he was seized.

when he was approached while parked

App. 2011)

(Ct.

Ofﬁcer Heaton did not issue any commands, never

touched Coronado, and never drew a weapon. His

p.13 (reporting Ofﬁcer Heaton as saying,

263 P.3d 145, 149

that

was already

Ofﬁcer Heaton was not

observing the open container 0f

consumed beer

that morning.

(R., p.78

(ﬁnding that while Coronado was searching for his license and registration, Ofﬁcer Heaton
observed him put an open container of alcohol in the back seat and then Coronado acknowledged
having a “couple” beers that morning». Coronado can be seen moving the beer can at 00:35 in
State’s EX.

1.

16

stopped in the parking

and willingly spoke with the ofﬁcer. The contact

lot

was consensual, not a detention”). Though another ofﬁcer
found that his

arrival

in the vehicle.

was

after

(R., p.83 n.5.)

arrived

0n scene, the

refuse any implied request.

this

point

district court

Ofﬁcer Heaton had already observed an open container of alcohol

Coronado does not contest

that

ﬁnding on appeal. Ofﬁcer Heaton

did ask if Coronado had a license and registration, but he did not

implication, even ask) to see

t0

them and did not convey

the

message

State V. Howell, 159 Idaho 245, 248,

demand
that

(and, except

by

Coronado could not

358 P.3d 806, 809

(Ct.

2015) (“Even when ofﬁcers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they

App.

may

generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine identiﬁcation”).

In short, but for the overhead lights, there

is

nothing t0 suggest that the encounter

between Ofﬁcer Heaton and Coronado was not consensual. As the Idaho Supreme Court and the
courts from other jurisdictions cited above have correctly held, overhead lights in a situation such

as this,

Where an ofﬁcer parks behind or near an already-parked vehicle,

effect a detention.

The

is

not alone sufﬁcient t0

did not err in holding that Coronado

district court therefore

was not

unlawfully detained.

D.

Any

Brief Detention

Of Coronado Was

Justiﬁed

BV

Reasonable Suspicion

Of Criminal

Conduct

Even

if the district court erred in

holding that Coronado was not seized

Heaton parked one 0r two car lengths behind him and turned on

by holding

that

Ofﬁcer Heaton had reasonable suspicion

When Ofﬁcer

his overhead lights,

it

did not err

to effect that very brief, non-intrusive

detention.

“[A]n investigatory detention

which justify suspicion

is

permissible if

that the detained person

is,

17

it is

based upon speciﬁc articulable facts

has been, or

is

about to be engaged in criminal

activity.”

Tag v.

State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.

Ohio, 392 U.s.

21 (1968); United States

1,

justiﬁcation for an investigative detention

known

Li “An

t0 the ofﬁcer.”

probabilities.”

State V.

is

Cortez, 449 U.s. 41

v.

1,

App. 2003)

(citing

417 (1981)). “The

evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances then

investigatory stop does not deal With hard certainties, but With

Munoz, 149 Idaho

121, 126, 233 P.3d 52, 57 (2010).

“Although a mere

‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires

is

considerably less than proof 0f wrongdoing by a preponderance 0f the evidence, and obviously
less than is necessary for

(internal quotations

“The

and

probable cause.”

an investigative detention] depends on the

level ofjustiﬁcation required [t0 justify

State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 81

211$ Pachosa, 160 Idaho at 38, 368 P.3d at 658.

Ofﬁcer Heaton parked behind him and
intrusive as

572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)

V. California,

citations omitted).

intrusiveness 0f the seizure.”

E

Navarette

one can be.” As the

Assuming

initiated his

district court

overhead

1,

203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).

that

Coronado was seized When

lights, the seizure

was

found, Coronado “was already parked on his

volition; the ofﬁcer did not alter 0r restrict the Defendant’s course, nor prevent

leaving.”

leave 0r

(R., p.83.)

was about

Coronado did not

to leave

testify at all,

when Ofﬁcer Heaton

Ofﬁcer Heaton turned 0n his overhead red and blue

it

was so non-intrusive

that, as

felt as

He

testify that

As

him from

he intended to

though he could not leave “[0]nce
he did not

state that

the district court found, and

argued above, there was n0 seizure

18

own

submitted an afﬁdavit in support

lights” (R., p.55), but

intended to leave 0r was in the process of doing so.

In fact,

and so did not

pulled up.

0f his motion to suppress in Which he stated that he

10

as non-

at all.

he

Coronado

When Ofﬁcer Heaton

arrived.

phone when Ofﬁcer Heaton approached the

vehicle.

does not contest, the engine of Coronado’s truck was not running

(R., p.83.)

(R., p.78.)

Coronado was talking 0n

He was

his

clearly not about t0

the alleged detention in this case

go anywhere and has never suggested otherwise. Thus,

amounts

t0

Coronado doing exactly What he was going

t0

be

doing anyway—sitting in his truck—but while having a cordial conversation with Ofﬁcer Heaton
for a matter of seconds.

Ofﬁcer Heaton had the reasonable suspicion necessary
invasive “detention.”

He was aware

that a resident in the

t0 justify that

neighborhood

who

very

brief,

non-

identiﬁed herself to

police called t0 report a suspicious vehicle parking at various locations in the neighborhood,

sitting for

Ls.10-20.)

a period 0f time, and then

E

the information

moving

t0 a different location.

State V. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334,

comes from a known

citizen’s disclosure

of her

out to be fabricated,

is

identity,

generally

336

(TL, p.13, Ls.14-20; p.14,

(Ct.

citizen informant rather than an

Which

carries the risk

deemed adequate

to

anonymous

0f accountability

show

App. 2000) (“Where
tipster, the

if the allegations turn

veracity and reliability”).

The

caller

described the vehicle, Coronado’s truck matched that description, and, as the caller reported, the

vehicle

L9.)

was occupied by an

individual just sitting 0n the side 0f the road. (TL, p.13, L.23

Ofﬁcer Heaton testiﬁed

that,

— p. 14,

though he was by no means convinced that there was any

criminal conduct afoot, the conduct that the resident described

was

consistent With a burglar

casing residences. (TL, p.16, Ls.6-22; R., p.85 (“the information [Ofﬁcer Heaton] received from
dispatch could be indicative 0f criminal activity, such as theft or burglary”).)

Though

probable cause t0 believe that Coronado was engaged in criminal conduct, and while

would not have justiﬁed a more invasive

clearly not

it

perhaps

detention, that information provided the reasonable

suspicion necessary to justify parking several car lengths behind Coronado; initiating his

19

overhead
to stop,

lights, in part for his

own

safety;

and talking brieﬂy With Coronado Without asking him

“Prompt inquiry

move, or do anything other than what he was already doing.

suspicious 0r unusual street activity

is

into

an indispensable police power in the orderly government

of urban communities.” Landreth, 139 Idaho

at

990, 88 P.3d at 1230.

have repeatedly held that reports of vehicles engaged in conduct

Idaho’s appellate courts

that ofﬁcers

View

as suspicious

contribute t0 reasonable suspicion justifying a brief investigatory detention. Li. at 991, 88 P.3d at

m

1231 (holding that Where store employee reported suspicious vehicle moving about in parking

lot,

ofﬁcer was justiﬁed in brief investigatory detention t0 check driving

Fairchild, 164 Idaho 336,

_, 429 P.3d 877,

882-83

(Ct.

status);

App. 2018) (holding

that ofﬁcer

had

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct t0 justify brief detention based in part on non-

anonymous

report of suspicious vehicles); State V. Howell, 159 Idaho 245, 247-49, 358 P.3d 806,

808-10

App. 2015) (holding

(Ct.

that

Where ofﬁcers responded

ofﬁcers had reasonable suspicion t0 brieﬂy detain defendant to

about ownership of travel

Coronado argues

of suspicious vehicles,

conﬁrm

driving status and ask

trailer).

that the district court erred because there

criminal activity suspected.”

legally mistaken.

t0 report

(Appellant’s brief, p.20.)

was not “any

That argument

is

particular

both factually and

“[R]easonable suspicion does not require a belief that any speciﬁc criminal

activity is afoot t0 justify

an investigative detention; instead,

all that is

required

is

a showing of

objective and speciﬁc articulable facts giving reason to believe that the individual has been or

about t0 be involved in some criminal activity.” State

P.3d 391, 397

(Ct.

App. 2014) (emphasis

original).

ofﬁcer t0 articulate some particular crime suspected.
articulate his suspicion that the driver

V.

is

Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 615, 329

Reasonable suspicion does not require an
Regardless, though, Ofﬁcer Heaton did

of the suspicious vehicle might be casing homes for

20

(TL, p.16, Ls.6-22.) That

burglary.

is

respect, this case is relevantly like

“reasonable suspicion” cases.

a “particular criminal activity suspected.” In

Tegy

E Tim,

V.

392 U.S.

reasonable suspicion for investigative detention
past and looking into store

window, conduct

According

store for burglary).

t0

Ohio, 392 U.S.

that

was

brief,

individuals repeatedly walking

consistent in his experience with casing the

Coronado, while “Ofﬁcer Heaton said that citizen reports of

[

]

how

burglars are caught,’ he did not

he believed Mr. Coronado might be preparing to burglarize a house.”

p.22 (quoting

T11, p.16, Ls.2-18).)

the words, “I believed Mr.

discusses “burglars”

here,

(1968), one 0f the seminal

22-23 (holding that ofﬁcer had

When he observed

unusual vehicles in a neighborhood are ‘occasionally
testify that

at 4-7,

1

who

fact, in that

Coronado

is

correct that

Coronado might be preparing

(Appellant’s

Ofﬁcer Heaton never uttered

t0 burglarize a house.”

are “casing places” engaging in behavior like that

But When he

Coronado engaged

in

he was responding t0 a question about Whether he was “suspicious” of “criminal activity”

When he

pulled behind Coronado.

testifying that

found exactly

(TL, p.16, Ls.6-18.)

Ofﬁcer Heaton was unambiguously

he suspected Coronado might be casing houses for burglary.
that.

(R., pp.77, 85.)

Coronado has not argued, much

less

The

district court

shown, that that

is

clear

error.

Next, Coronado argues that Ofﬁcer Heaton did not have reasonable suspicion 0f criminal

conduct because “Ofﬁcer Heaton testiﬁed that he
looking for a work

site,

initially

though the driver was probably

10st or

although the circumstances reported t0 dispatch could be indicative of

criminal activity,” and because “Mr. Coronado could have simply been lost.” (Appellant’s brief,

pp.20-21.)

This argument mistakenly assumes that an ofﬁcer cannot simultaneously have

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and recognize that the conduct might well be

21

“[T]he Supreme Court 0f the United States has consistently recognized that

innocent.“

reasonable suspicion need not rule out the possibility 0f innocent conduct.”

State V. Perez, 164

Idaho 626, 628, 434 P.3d 801, 803 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because “the level

of suspicion required t0 create a reasonable suspicion

and considerably

less than

than

is

necessary for probable cause

proof by a preponderance 0f the evidence,”

it

should frequently be true

an ofﬁcer will reasonably suspect criminal conduct while recognizing that

that

probable than not that the conduct

that

is less

Coronado might have been, and, perhaps, probably was,

his reasonable suspicion that

The

call

casing

burglar

Li Ofﬁcer Heaton’s

at issue is in fact innocent.

lost

was

it

is

more

recognition

perfectly consistently with

he might be engaged in criminal conduct.

from a resident Who identiﬁed herself and described behavior consistent With a
provided

residences

Ofﬁcer Heaton reason

suspect

to

criminal

conduct,

notwithstanding the fact that he also recognized that the behavior might well be innocent.

That

reasonable suspicion was sufﬁcient to justify the exceptionally non-invasive detention alleged

here.

In

E.

The

Alternative,

The

Brief,

Non-Invasive Detention

Was

Justiﬁed

BV The Community

Caretaking Function

The

state

argued below

that,

even

if

Coronado was seized and even

justiﬁed by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct,
fulﬁlling his

11

It

community caretaking

function.

it

if that seizure

was justiﬁed because Ofﬁcer Heaton was

(R., pp.69-71.)

The

district court

did not reach the

also fails to recognize the objective nature of the reasonable suspicion inquiry.

on Whether,
at issue,

was not

The focus

is

as an objective matter, the information available to the ofﬁcer justiﬁed the detention

not what the ofﬁcer in fact thought about Whether the information provided reasonable

suspicion.

E

State V. Spies, 157 Idaho 269, 272,

22

335 P.3d 609, 612

(Ct.

App. 2014).

issue.

(R., p.85.)

State V. Hoskins,

Nevertheless, the issue

is

preserved for appeal having been presented below.

165 Idaho 217, 443 P.3d 231, 236 (2019) (clarifying “right

theory” rule and holding that court

may afﬁrm

a lower court decision

0n

wrong

result,

alternative grounds

presented to but not addressed by the district court below).

As

discussed above, this case

is

unlike Mireles with respect to whether a seizure

occurred. But With respect t0 the application of the

m.
citizens

community caretaking

function,

very like

it is

“The community caretaking function involves the duty 0f police ofﬁcers
an ofﬁcer reasonably believes

991 P.2d

at 880.

may be

in

need 0f assistance.”

“Regardless of Which justiﬁcation

intrusive action of the police

693, 991 P.2d at 881.

is

interest furthered

by

133 Idaho

at

be reasonable in View 0f all the surrounding circumstances.”

“In determining the scope of the

community caretaking

case, reasonableness is determined

“As one court has phrased

by balancing

Li. at

function, Idaho

it,

in a

the public need and

the police conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion

m

692,

used, the Constitution requires that the

courts have adopted a totality of the circumstances test.” Li.

community caretaker

m,

t0 help

upon the

privacy 0f the citizen.” Li. (internal quotation marks omitted).

As

discussed above, in

an ofﬁcer was following a vehicle reported as suspicious,

the vehicle suddenly pulled to the side of the road, the ofﬁcer initiated his overhead lights, and

parked behind the vehicle.

Li. at 691,

991 P.2d

at

879.

While the Court of Appeals held

that

there

was a

brief,

non-invasive seizure was justiﬁed by the community caretaking function. Citing a number

seizure in that case for the reasons discussed above,

0f cases addressing the use of overhead

went 0n

t0

hold that the very

lights in similar circumstances, the court

“While the activation 0f overhead emergency
other purposes, such as warning

it

lights

may be used to show

oncoming motorists

23

to

authority,

it

noted

that,

also serves

be careful and thus providing greater

and the

safety for the ofﬁcer

citizen.”

Li Finding

that the ofﬁcer

had reason

t0 believe there

might be something wrong with the driver or the vehicle, and that the “intrusion into Mireles’s
privacy was minimal,” the court held that the community caretaking ﬁmction justiﬁed the very
brief detention associated With the use 0f overhead lights.

As was
minimal; in

pattern.

Who

the detention of Mireles, any intrusion into Coronado’s privacy

fact,

even running.

Li
was exceptionally

even more so than was the detention 0f Mireles, as Coronado’s vehicle was not

Ofﬁcer Heaton knew

Though

(TL, p.13, Ls.14-20.)

Coronado’s vehicle had engaged in a strange driving

that

that information

came through

reports

from a resident

identiﬁed herself (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-20), not ﬁrsthand, as did the information in

distinction is irrelevant.

m,

135 Idaho

which the reporter identiﬁes herself
Heaton testiﬁed

that

are

at 101, 15

P.3d

at

“deemed adequate” with respect

think Coronado might be

lost.

m.

(R., p.77).

The same driving

E

that

336 (information from reports

he thought Coronado might be having car troubles

Ls.7—13), just as did the ofﬁcer in

m,

Ofﬁcer

to reliability).

(Tr., p.16,

in

Ls.6-22; p.20,

pattern also provided reason t0

State V. Bakewell,

730 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Neb.

2007) (ﬁnding community caretaking function justiﬁed brief detention Where previous driving
pattern 0f already-parked vehicle suggested there might be something

the occupant might be lost). Finally, as did the ofﬁcer in Mireles,

initiated his

overhead

lights for safety reasons, t0

people t0 avoid hitting you

1

When

wrong With

the vehicle or

Ofﬁcer Heaton testiﬁed

that

he

avoid a “trafﬁc hazard” and because “you want

you’re walking in the middle of the street.”

(TL, p.15, Ls.1-

1.)

In a footnote,

Coronado addresses the community caretaking function and argues

Ofﬁcer Heaton did not need
real distinction

t0 initiate his

overhead

lights.

(Appellant’s brief, p.5 n3.)

The only

with respect to the application of the community caretaking function between

24

that

this

case and

m

overhead

overhead

that the events in

Though

the morning.

that the

is

occurred

the state acknowledges that that

lights served

lights alert

m

at night,

is

While the events here occurred in

a relevant distinction,

no safety ﬁmction. As Ofﬁcer Heaton

oncoming trafﬁc 0f the need

t0 take a

found the testimony credible.

slight imposition

on Coronado’s privacy,

it

(R., p.83.)

was

testiﬁed,

does not follow

even in daylight,

Wide berth around the parked vehicles

because of the potential presence of an ofﬁcer in the roadway.
district court

it

That

common

is

sense and the

Particularly in light 0f the extremely

perfectly reasonable for

Ofﬁcer Heaton

to take

that precaution to safeguard his safety.

Coronado

also suggests that

Coronado’s vehicle t0 speak

Mr. Coronado

had done

if

t0

him

Ofﬁcer Heaton did not need

at all,

but could have “simply rolled

he was okay.” (Appellant’s

that instead,

brief, p.5 n.3.)

he would certainly have initiated his overhead

More

importantly, the

park and walk up t0

down his Window

Of course, even

hazard While parked in the middle 0f the road and Coronado would
unlawfully seized.

t0

same could have been

still

to ask

if

Ofﬁcer Heaton

lights to

avoid a trafﬁc

have argued that he was

said in Mireles and that fact did

not prevent the conclusion that the brief detention there was justiﬁed by the community
caretaking function.

0f the (very

The question

slight) extent

is

simply Whether the brief detention was reasonable in light

of the imposition on Coronado’s privacy.

E

State V.

Godwin, 121

Idaho 491, 495-96, 826 P.2d 452, 456-57 (1992) (holding that Where ofﬁcer pulled over near
already-parked t0 determine if occupant needed assistance, turned on emergency lights, and

thereafter effected detention

when he

checked the occupant’s driving
in part for safety reasons).

It

told the occupant of the vehicle to stay in the car while he

status, that brief detention

clearly was.
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was reasonable, and

therefore justiﬁed,

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm Coronado’s judgment of conviction.

19th day of May, 2020.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy of the foregoing BRIEF
and Serve:

that I

have

day 0f May, 2020, served a true and correct
t0 the attorney listed below by means of iCourt

this 19th

OF RESPONDENT

File

SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

AVW/dd

26

